While the server is running, it is not possible for a malicious user
   to take the place of the normal database server.  However, when the
   server is down, it is possible for a local user to spoof the normal
   server by starting their own server.  The spoof server could read
   passwords and queries sent by clients, but could not return any data
   because the PGDATA directory would still be secure because
   of directory permissions. Spoofing is possible because any user can
   start a database server; a client cannot identify an invalid server
   unless it is specially configured.
  
   One way to prevent spoofing of local
   connections is to use a Unix domain socket directory (unix_socket_directories) that has write permission only
   for a trusted local user.  This prevents a malicious user from creating
   their own socket file in that directory.  If you are concerned that
   some applications might still reference /tmp for the
   socket file and hence be vulnerable to spoofing, during operating system
   startup create a symbolic link /tmp/.s.PGSQL.5432 that points
   to the relocated socket file.  You also might need to modify your
   /tmp cleanup script to prevent removal of the symbolic link.
  
   Another option for local connections is for clients to use
   requirepeer
   to specify the required owner of the server process connected to
   the socket.
  
To prevent spoofing on TCP connections, either use SSL certificates and make sure that clients check the server's certificate, or use GSSAPI encryption (or both, if they're on separate connections).
   To prevent spoofing with SSL, the server
   must be configured to accept only hostssl connections (Section 20.1) and have SSL key and certificate files
   (Section 18.9). The TCP client must connect using
   sslmode=verify-ca or
   verify-full and have the appropriate root certificate
   file installed (Section 32.19.1). Alternatively the
   system CA pool, as defined
   by the SSL implementation, can be used using sslrootcert=system; in
   this case, sslmode=verify-full is forced for safety, since
   it is generally trivial to obtain certificates which are signed by a public
   CA.
  
   To prevent server spoofing from occurring when using
   scram-sha-256 password authentication
   over a network, you should ensure that you connect to the server using SSL
   and with one of the anti-spoofing methods described in the previous
   paragraph. Additionally, the SCRAM implementation in
   libpq cannot protect the entire authentication
   exchange, but using the channel_binding=require connection
   parameter provides a mitigation against server spoofing. An attacker that
   uses a rogue server to intercept a SCRAM exchange can use offline analysis to
   potentially determine the hashed password from the client.
  
    To prevent spoofing with GSSAPI, the server must be configured to accept
    only hostgssenc connections
    (Section 20.1) and use gss
    authentication with them.  The TCP client must connect
    using gssencmode=require.